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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2033  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [MTCRE](#) [KSCA](#) [GM](#) [IR](#) [ML](#) [SN](#)  
SUBJECT: MALAYSIAN FIRM SUPPLYING GERMAN-ORIGIN TEST  
CHAMBERS TO IRANIAN PROCUREMENT AGENT (S)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D).

11. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

12. (S) Background/Objectives: The United States has information indicating that a Malaysian firm has been working to acquire German-origin test chambers on behalf of Amin Ravan, an Iranian procurement agent. The Malaysian entity, Toshi Electronics, has already sold at least one Weiss Umwelttechnik (WUT) chamber to Ravan, and as of early July was in the process of supplying Ravan with two VT7004 test chambers manufactured by Voetsch Industrietechnik. These types of test chambers, while not controlled, can be used by missile developers to subject missile components to the extreme environmental conditions during a ballistic missile's flight. Ravan is associated with the Singaporean company CoreZing, a firm which has sought materials on behalf of Iran Integrated Electrics Industries and the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO - the umbrella organization and key procurement center for all Iranian industries responsible for developing and manufacturing missiles). In its attempts to procure the VT7004 chambers from Voetsch, Toshi appeared to be working with the Malaysian intermediary Centriforce, and has falsely advised Centriforce that the equipment will be used in Malaysia rather than Iran. We do not have any information on the specific identity of the intended end-user of the Voetsch equipment, but given Ravan and CoreZing's procurement history, we are concerned that it could be an entity of proliferation concern. We therefore want to bring this information to the attention of German officials, and request that they investigate and take measures to prevent Voetsch and Weiss Umwelttechnik from any further supply of their products to Iranian end-users of proliferation concern.

13. (S) Action Request: Department requests Embassy Berlin approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points in paragraph 4. Talking points can be left as a non-paper.

14. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL GERMANY)

-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity.

-- We have information indicating that a Malaysian firm has recently been active in procuring German-origin test chambers on behalf of an Iranian procurement agent.

-- Specifically, we understand that as of June 2008, the Malaysian firm Toshi Electric supplied an unspecified chamber manufactured by Weiss Umwelttechnik (WUT) GmbH to Amin Ravan in Iran.

-- We also understand WUT was preparing to send spare parts to Toshi.

-- We do not know the identity of the ultimate end-user, but Amin Ravan is associated with the Singapore-based entity CoreZing, which has sought materials on behalf of Iran Integrated Electronics Industries and the Iran Aerospace Industries Organization.

-- The EU in June 2008 added Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and Iran Electronics Industries to its list of sanctioned Iranian entities. AIO is the umbrella organization and key procurement center for all Iranian industries responsible for developing and manufacturing missiles.

-- In addition, we have information that in early July, Ravan provided a purchase order to Toshi for two VT7004 test chambers manufactured by Voetsch Industrietechnik GmbH.

-- While these test chambers are not MTCR-controlled, they could be used to test thermal responses for missile guidance components such as gyroscopes and accelerometers.

-- We do not believe that Toshi is conducting business directly with Voetsch. Rather, Toshi appears to be working with another Malaysian supplier, Centriforce Instruments Sdn Bhd.

-- We understand that Toshi falsely advised Centriforce that the units would be used in Malaysia as opposed to Iran.

-- Although the intended Iranian end-user of the Voetsch equipment is unknown, it is likely the same as the one that received the WUT chamber from Toshi.

-- We urge you to investigate this information and to take measures to prevent Voetsch and Weiss Umwelttechnik from any further supply of their products to potential entities of proliferation concern.

-- We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation matters and would appreciate hearing any updates on the progress of your investigation of this case.

15. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up related to this case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/CE and EUR/PRA.

16. (U) A Word version file of this document will be posted at [www.state.sgov.gov/demarche](http://www.state.sgov.gov/demarche).  
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